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BRIEF OF STATE OF UTAH IN OPPOSITION 
TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
We contended here before and we contend here again 
that it was error in the Court below to permit the defen-
dants' expert witnesses to arrive at the "market value" of 
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the land taken by multiplying the yards of material by a 
given price and adding the obtained sum to the claimed 
values of other component parts of the estate. We are at 
a complete loss to comprehend the statement of your peti-
tioners when they say that, "* * * no such supposed 
error [s] was advanced by the plaintiff * * * in the 
record on appeal * * * or covered by the points argued 
on appeal * * *." We have strongly contended through-
out that it was not proper to multiply the number of tons 
of estimated material by a given price per unit and to add 
the amount obtained thereby to other claimed items of 
damage to arrive at market value. This is exactly what 
petitioners' expert witnesses did do--and did admit doing. 
"* * * the evidence of defendants' experts 
shows with abundant clearness that they arrived at 
their determination of the value of the lands in ques-
tion by multiplying the estimate * * * as to 
the tons of sand and gravel in place by the estimated 
value per ton." (Opinion of the Court.) 
Your petitioners cannot successfully contend otherwise. 
STATEMENT OF POINT 
POINT I. 
THE LANDOWNER IN DEALING WITH A 
PARCEL OF LAND ON WHICH THERE IS 
MINERAL MAY NOT ESTABLISH FAIR MAR-
KET VALUE BY EXPERT TESTIMONY BY 
WHICH THE EXPERT MULTIPLIES THE 
GROSS MATERIAL PRESENT BY THE MAR-
KET VALUE PER UNIT. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LANDOWNER IN DEALING WITH A 
PARCEL OF LAND ON WHICH THERE IS 
MINERAL MAY NOT ESTABLISH FAIR MAR-
KET VALUE BY EXPERT TESTIMONY BY 
WHICH THE EXPERT MULTIPLIES THE 
GROSS MATERIAL PRESENT BY THE MAR-
KET VALUE PER UNIT. 
Petitioners return to this Court with complete renewed 
reliance upon the case of National Brick Co. v. United 
States, 76 U. S. App. D. C. 329, 131 Fed. 2d 30; the case 
is reproduced in toto in their brief. We submit that the law, 
logic and reasoning in the decision of this Honorable Court 
heretofore rendered in this cause is susceptible to a more 
certain defense against assault than the holdfng of the case, 
supra, upon which petitioners seek this rehearing. In fair-
ness we think that petitioners should have called to the 
Court's attention the more recent authority, United States 
v. Land in Dry Bed of Rosamond Lake, Cal., et al., (July 
1956) 143 Fed. Supp. 314. This case discusses the National 
Brick Co. case as well as numerous others which have con-
cerned themselves with the issues here. We think that these 
more recent holdings clearly sustain our contention that this 
Court has ruled correctly; the petition for rehearing should 
be denied. 
United States v. Land in Dry Bed of Rosamond Lake, 
Cal., et al., supra, was an action concerning lands lying in 
a dry lake bed which were taken by the government through 
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eminent domain. The issue was fair market value. The 
condemnee contending that the land's best use was for 
mining sites for the production of rotary clay used in oil 
drilling. Said the Court: 
"* * * The question now arises on trial, as 
to what testin1ony the experts for the landowners 
may give. 
" (a) Quantity and Quality of rock, mineral or 
timber in place and the per ton or unit value thereof 
cannot be multiplied out to give market value; nor 
may it be valued separate from the land. '* * * 
The separate valuation of timber or rock attached 
to land, or valuations arrived at by a process of mul-
tiplying the number of cubic feet or yards by a given 
price per unit, are not approved bases for evaluation. 
United States [ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority] 
v. Indian Creek Marble Co., D. C., 40 F. Supp. 811. 
* * *' United States v. 13.40 Acres, D. C. Cal. 
1944, 56 F. Supp. 535, at page 538. From the facts 
of that case, the experts for the landowner did ex-
actly the thing shown in the quote, namely multi-
plied the yards by a given price and arrived at a 
valuation. The court properly granted a motion for 
a new trial. * * * 
"* * * In National Brick Co. v. United 
States, 1942, 76 U. S. App. D. C. 329, 131 F. 2d 30, 
the land in question contained a sand bank contain-
ing 300,000 cubic yards of pure sand. The court 
prevented the landowners' expert from giving testi-
mony concerning the value per ton of the sand from 
the bank, as to whether he had bought sand of the 
same quality and what he had paid for it, and as to 
the value of the land with the sand. The court lim-
ited the testimony to the fair market value of the 
property for land as real estate. The judgment was 
reversed and remanded for a new trial. The circuit 
court said, 131 F. 2d at page 31: 
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"'* * * And we know of no other evi-
dence by which the jury could be properly 
guided in determining the value of the property 
than to be told the per ton value of the sand as 
it lay, or, without this knowledge, how the jury 
could ever have reached a judgment based on 
anything more than guess or speculation. * * *' 
"The court in its concluding paragraph, said, 
131 F. 2d at page 32: 
" '* * * We think the inquiry should 
have been whether the property was valuable in 
the open market for the sale of sand or for the 
use of sand in the making of bricks; and that 
in order to reach a fair conclusion in this re-
spect the jury should have been informed by 
competent witnesses as to the quantity of the 
sand, the quality of the sand, the uses to which 
it might be put, whether there was a market for 
it, and the value of the land with the sand in 
that market in its then condition. * * *' 
"This final statement we think to be a correct 
statement of law and the resulting decision correct. 
We cannot agree with the earlier portion of the opin-
ion if it purports to say that the fair market value 
of the sand in place could be presented to the jury, 
separate and apart from the valuation of the land 
itself. 
"It is something totally different to permit an 
expert to inform a jury, that one factor considered 
was the amount of sand in place and its price per 
ton. This is the presentation of a factor which might 
well have been considered in the market place, and 
is not independent evidence of the fair market value 
of the sand. * * * 
"* * * In Cade v. United States, 4 Cir., 
1954, 213 F. 2d 138, 141, the court found error 
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in the exclusion of testimony of experts who testi-
fied there was a deposit of granite rock on the 
ground which was reasonably worth $25,000. The 
court said: '* * * There was no reason why 
their testimony as to the value of the deposit of 
rock should not have been admitted for considera-
tion by the jury in estimating the value of the land 
taken. * * *' The court also cited with ap-
proval National Brick Co. v. United States, supra. 
"The fourth circuit had earlier permitted the 
separate value of timber to be stated, apart from the 
value of the land, including the timber thereon, 
United States v. 5139.5 Acres, etc., 4 Cir., 1952, 200 
F. 2d 659, 661. 
"We think the better rule is stated by the fifth, 
sixth and seventh circuits. Georgia Kaolin Co. v. 
United States, 5 Cir., 1954, 214 F. 2d 284, at page 
286, states: 
" 'In eminent domain proceedings, the ex-
istence of valuable mineral deposits in the con-
demned land constitutes an element which may 
be taken into consideration if and in so far as 
it influences the market value of the land. The 
reason for this rule is said to be that the mea-
sure of compensation in such cases is the mar-
ket value of the land to be condemned, taken 
as a whole and with due consideration of all 
the components that tend to make its market 
value. This rule has been applied to limestone, 
deposits, gold ore, fire clay, coal, stone, and sand 
and gravel, 156 A. L. R. 1416-1417; but there 
can be no recovery for both the value of the 
land and its mineral deposits as two separate 
items. Atlanta Terra Cotta Co. v. Georgia Ry. 
& Electric Co., 132 Ga. 537, 64 S. E. 563; United 
States v. 620.00 Acres of Land, etc., D. C., 101 
F. Supp. 686; Orgel on Valuation, under Emi-
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nent Domain, page 544, rejecting the method 
of estimating the amount of stone in situ and 
multiplying this amount by a fixed price per 
unit; also citing Searle v. Lackawanna and 
Bloomsburg Railroad Co., 33 Pa. 57. In reject-
ing the method of multiplying the estimated 
amount of clay by a fixed price per unit, the 
conclusion is largely based on its speculative-
ness. In discussing this point, the court below 
said that whether or not the deposits would be 
mined and the royalties paid would depend upon 
the condition of the market, the uncertainty of 
the future, the demand for the product, "and 
many other elements, on and on, in the future."' 
"United States v. Meyer, 7 Cir., 1940, 113 F. 2d 
387, at page 397, states: 
" 'Likewise the value of timber growing 
upon the land was immaterial. The test is the 
value of the real estate as a whole and separate 
valuation of the timber would necessitate an-
other valuation of the land thereof. All of the 
facts and circumstances bearing upon the con-
dition and nature of the land as a whole and its 
possible use are proper as elements bearing 
upon value, but separate appraisements of the 
different elements constituting the whole are 
improper.' Morton Butler Timber Co. v. United 
States, 6 Cir., 1937, 91 F. 2d 884, 887-888. 
"* * * 
"* * * Conclusions. 
"From the foregoing we would summarize the 
law as follows: 
" ( 1) that a landowner in dealing with a par-
cel of land on which there is a mineral, timber or 
like substance may not introduce expert testimony 
by which the expert multiplies the gross material 
present by the market value per unit thereof and 
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thereby arrives at a figure which purports to be fair 
market value for the parcel; * * * 
"* * * ( 3) that the landowner is entitled 
to have an expert or lay witness describe the com-
modity or substance on the land, the quantity there-
of, the going price thereof as factors only, upon 
which the expert may in part base his value as to 
the fair market value of the parcel in question; that 
a landowner is not entitled to present testimony as 
to the fair market value of the mineral or timber or 
other substance apart from the value of the land. 
Insofar as Clark, Cade and National Brick cases, 
supra, may so hold or indicate to the contrary, we 
find ourselves in disagreement therewith ; that if 
the holding of N atio'J'lal Brick, supra, is restricted 
to the portion quoted in this memorandum, which 
portion is the concluding paragraph of the opinion, 
we are not in disagreement with National Brick. In 
other words, a clear distinction must be drawn be-
tween what is presented and considered as a factor 
underlying the expert's opinion as contrasted with 
opinion as to the fair market value of the substance, 
timber or mineral itself, apart from the land. * * * 
"* * * As in all cases involving the opinion 
of the expert as to fair market value, the jury should 
be instructed that the factors considered by the ex-
pert are not in themselves direct evidence of the 
fair n1arket value of the land condemned, but may 
be considered by the jury only for the purpose of 
determining what weight, if any, the jury accords to 
the testimony of the expert in his ultimate opinion 
as to the fair market value of the land in question 
as of the date of taking." 
Finally, we think the statement in petitioners' brief 
in Point VII thereof, made as follows: 
"At the time of trial, the appellant made no 
objection that the respondents were endeavoring to 
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establish the value of the land by multiplying the 
quantity of sand by the price per ton." 
is manifestly unfair to the record. The objections made to 
the testimony of the experts Howa, (R. 256, 7, 8) Gaddis 
(R. 275), though they might have been more clearly and 
better made, went to the very fact that these wttnesses 
were using a purely mathematical means of computation 
to arrive at a value. 
We do not deny that the State's experts were permitted 
to express themselves also as to the quantity, quality and 
value per yard of the materials; and it appears from the 
testimony and the exhibits that the fair market value ar-
rived at by these appraisers also amounted to a mathemati-
cal computation together with a process of addition of other 
values. Admitting then that in the trial of this cause a 
clear distinction was not drawn between what was presented 
as a factor underlying the experts' opinions as to fair mar-
ket value and as to their opinion of the fair market value, 
we submit that such error can only be rectified through the 
process of a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Petition for rehearing should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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